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Abst rac t - - In  this paper, we propose an efficient construction of perfect secret sharing schemes 
for graph-based access tructures where a vertex denotes a participant and an edge does a qualified 
pair of participants. The secret sharing scheme is based on the assumptions that the pairs of partic- 
ipants corresponding to edges in the graph can compute the master key but the pairs of participants 
corresponding to nonedges in the graph cannot. The information rate of our scheme is 1/ (n  - 1), 
where n is the number of participants. We also present an application of our scheme to the reduction 
of storage and computation loads on the communication granting server in a secure network. 
Keywords - -Secret  sharing scheme, Data security, Cryptography, Access structure. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, Ito et al. described a general method of secret sharing called secret sharing scheme (SSS) 
which allows a master key to be shared among a finite set of participants in such a way that only 
certain prespecified subsets of participants can recover the master key [1]. Let P be the set of 
participants. The collection of subsets of participants that can reconstruct the secret in this way 
is called the access structure (denoted by F). The collection of subsets of participants that cannot 
obtain any information about the secret is called the prohibited structure (denoted by A) [2]. The 
natural restriction is that F is monotone increasing and A is monotone decreasing; that is, 
- i fAcFandAC_BC__P ,  thenBEF ,  and 
- i fAEAandBC_AC_P ,  thenBEA.  
If A = 2 p \ F, then we say the structure (F, A) is complete [2]. Let ]C be the master key space 
and $ be the share space. The information rate for the secret sharing scheme is defined to be 
log 2 I1~]/log 2 ]S[ (see [3]). A construction for a secret sharing scheme is some concrete realization 
of the scheme. The concept of an (m, n)-threshold scheme, m < n, is to transform a master key, 
top secret, into n shares in such a way that the master key cannot be reclaimed unless m or more 
shares are collected [4,5]. It is clear that the threshold scheme is a way of constructing secret 
sharing schemes. A secret sharing scheme is called perfect if any set of participants in the pro- 
hibited structure A obtains no information regarding the master key [2,6,7]. Given any complete 
structure (F, A) (i.e., A = 2 P \ F), Ito et al. showed that there exists a perfect secret sharing 
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scheme to realize the structure [1,8]. Benaloh and Leichter proposed a different algorithm to 
realize secret sharing schemes for any given monotone access tructure [9]. In both constructions, 
the information rate decreases exponentially as a function of n, the number of participants. 
There are several performance and efficiency measures proposed for analyzing secret sharing 
schemes [1,10]. Their goal is to maximize the information rate of a secret sharing scheme. Brick- 
ell and Stinson studied a perfect secret sharing scheme for a graph-based structure where the 
monotone-increasing access tructure F contains the pairs of participants corresponding to edges, 
and the prohibited structure A is the collection of subsets of participants corresponding to any 
independent set of the graph [1]. They proved that, for any graph G with n vertices having max- 
imum degree d, there exists a perfect secret sharing scheme realizing G in which the information 
rate is at least 2/(d ÷ 3). In the worst case when d = n - 1, the information rate is 2/(n ÷ 2). 
The structure of their secret sharing scheme is complete. However, their construction is difficult 
to use because it needs to maintain a large access check matrix with at least [/CI- d rows. It is 
also time-consuming to recover the master key by looking up the large access check matrix. 
In this paper, we propose an efficient construction of a perfect secret sharing scheme for ac- 
cess/prohibited structures based on a graph where the monotone-increasing access structure F 
contains the pairs of participants corresponding to edges, and the monotone-decreasing prohib- 
ited structure A contains the pairs of participants corresponding to nonedges. The information 
rate of our scheme is 1/(n - 1), where n is the number of participants. Our scheme does not 
need to maintain a large access check matrix, and thus is more efficient than the Brickell and 
Stinson's method. We also present an application of our scheme to the reduction of storage and 
computation loads on the communication granting server in a secure network. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose a construction of perfect se- 
cret sharing schemes for graph-based access/prohibited structures. In Section 3, we discuss the 
application of our construction. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 4. 
2. CONSTRUCTION OF  PERFECT MONOTONE SSS 
FOR GRAPH-BASED ACCESS/PROHIB ITED STRUCTURES 
It is difficult to efficiently construct a secret sharing scheme for any access structure due to its 
irregular nature. In this paper, we focus only on the graph-based access/prohibited structures 
that have interesting features. For convenience, we abbreviate the secret sharing scheme for 
graph G to SSS(G). Let P be the set of participants, and G be a graph where a vertex denotes 
a participant in P and an edge does a pair of participants. In a perfect secret sharing scheme 
for access/prohibited structures based on G, a pair of participants corresponding to an edge of G 
can compute the master key, while a pair of participants corresponding to a nonedge of G cannot 
obtain any information regarding the master key. We use E to denote the set of edges of G; 
NE  to denote the set of nonedges of G; S to denote the set of pairs of participants corresponding 
to edges of G; R to denote the set of pairs of participants corresponding to nonedges of G. It is 
reasonable to restrict that the access structure and prohibited structure are monotone. That is, 
- if A E S and A C_ B C_ P,  B can compute the master key, and 
- if A E R and B C_ A _C P, B can obtain no information regarding the master key. 
Thus, the access structure F = {B [ A E S and A C_ B C P}, and the prohibited structure 
A = {B [ A E R and B C_ A C_ p}.  
Here, we only consider the case of an access graph G which is connected. If graph G is not 
connected, we can divide G into two or more connected components. Each component is realized 
by a perfect secret sharing scheme, respectively. Our access graph is based on the assumptions 
as Brickell and Stinson's chemes [3] that graphs do not have loops or multiple edges. 
In the following, we will use the conventional threshold schemes [4,5] to construct he perfect 
secret sharing schemes for graph-based access structures. We assume that all computations are 
over GF(q) where q is a prime which is larger than the size of the master key space. 
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Given a connected graph G without loops, a secret sharing scheme for the access structure 
based on the graph G is constructed as follows. Assume that P = {Pl,P2 . . . .  ,Pn} is the set 
of participants corresponding to the vertices of the graph G. We first construct n conventional 
(2, n)-threshold schemes [4,5], named TS1,TS2, . . . ,  and TSn. To avoid ambiguity, we call the 
master key and the shares of each TS~ submaster key and subshares, respectively. For each 
(2, n)-TSi, let k~ be its submaster key and si,1, s i ,2, . . . ,  si,~ be its n subshares. Thus, given any 
two subshares, si,j and s~,k (1 _< j < k <_ n), the submaster key ki can be recovered, but less 
than two subshares provide no information about k~. 
The master key of the secret sharing scheme for the access structure based on the graph G is 
given by K = kl + k2 +. . .  + kn (mod q), where ki is randomly selected over GF(q),  for 1 < i < n. 
The share of participant Pi is given by Si = (ai,1,... ,a i , t , . . .  ,aw~), where 1 < t < n, 
ai,t = kt if PiPt is an edge of G, 
ai,t = st,i if PiPt is not an edge of G and t ¢ i, and 
ai,t is empty if t = i. 
Thus, the constructed secret sharing scheme satisfies: 
(1) if A E S and A C B C P, B can compute the master key; 
(2) if A E R and B C_ A C_ P, B can obtain no information regarding the master key. 
THEOREM 1. I f  A E S and A C B C P,  B can compute the master key of  the constructed secret 
sharing scheme for the access structure based on the graph C. 
PaOOF. BecauseA C_ B and A E S, there existsp~,pj E B (i ¢ j )  such that~ E E. The 
share of Pi is S~ = (a~,l, a~,2,..., ai,~} and the share of pj is Sj = (aj,], a j ,2 , . . . ,  aj,n). 
Because PiPj is an edge of G, we can conclude that for any t, 1 < t < n, one of the following 
three cases holds: 
(1) ai,t = St,i or kt, and aj,t =-  St,j or Ict if t ¢ i and t ~; j; 
(2) ai,t = empty and aj,t = kt if t = i; 
(3) ai,t = kt and aj,t = empty if t = j. 
In all these cases (1), (2), and (3), the submaster key k t can  be recovered. Thus, participant Pi 
and participant py can recover the submaster keys kl, k2, . . . ,  kn and hence the master key K. | 
THEOREM 2. I f  A E R and B C A C_ P,  then B can obtain no information regarding the master 
key of the constructed secret sharing scheme for the access structure based on the graph G. 
PaOOF. Because ]AI = 2 and B c_ A, Igl <_ 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
B = {Pi, Pj }, where i ¢ j. Because B C__ A and A E R, ~ E NE.  
The share of Pi is Si = (ai,1, a i ,2, . . . ,  ai,n} and the share of pj is Sj = (aj,1, a3,2,.. . ,  aj,~). 
Because pipj is not an edge of G, we can conclude that for any t, 1 < t < n, one of the following 
three cases holds: 
(1) ai,t = st,i or kt, and aj,t = 8t,j or kt if t ¢ i and t ¢ j; 
(2) ai,t ~- empty and aj,t = st,j if t = i; 
(3) ai,t -= st,i and aj, t = empty if t = j. 
In case (1), the submaster key kt can be recovered. In case (2), ai,i and aj,i can obtain only 
one subshare si,j of the (2, n)-TSi. Therefore, pi and pj get no information about the submaster 
key ki. In ease (3), ai,j and aj,j can obtain only one subshare sj,i of the (2, n)-TSj. Therefore, 
p~ and pj get no information about the submaster key kj.  
Because K = kl + k2 + . . .  + kn (mod q), Pi and pj get no information about the master 
key K. | 
The share of participant Pi, (ai ,1,. . . ,ai ,t  . . . . .  ai,~), is an n-dimensional vector. Except that 
a~,i is empty, every ai,j is over GF(q).  Therefore, the size of the share space is qn -1  and the 
size of the master key space is q. It is clear that the information rate of our secret sharing 
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Figure 1. Graph G with six participants. 
scheme for graph-based access structure is log 2 q/ log 2 qn-m = 1/(n - 1), where n is the number 
of participants. 
We demonstrate the use of our method in the following example. In Figure 1, the graph G 
denotes the access/prohibited structures with six participants. The graph G has a set of edges E 
and a set of nonedges NE,  where 
E = {PlP2,PlP6,P2P3,P3P4,P4P5,P4P6,PsP6}, and 
NE = {Pip3, pxP4, PiPs, p2p4, P2Ps, p2P6, P3P5, p3P6} • 
The  secret sharing scheme for the access/prohibited structures based on the graph G is con- 
structed as follows. 
Let P = {Pl,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6}. Thus, 
S = {{Pl,P2},{Pl,P6},{P2,P3},{P3,P4},{P4,P5},{P4,P6},{P5,P6}} and 
R :  {{pl,P3},{Pl,P4},{Pl,P5},{P2,Pn},{P2,P5},{P2,P6},{P3,P5},{P3,P6}}. 
The access structure 










The prohibited structure 
A:  {¢,{Pl},{P2},{P3},{P4},{Ps},{P6},{Pl,P3},{Pl,P4}, 
Let TS1,TS2, . . . ,  and TS6 be six (2,6)-threshold schemes. We assume that k~ is the submaster 
key of TSi and si.1, s~,2,,.., and si,n are the subshares of TS~. Here we use Shamir's method [5] 
to construct hese threshold schemes. For each (2, 6)-TSi, let 
f i (x)  = ri . x + ki (mod q) 
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be a secret polynomial of degree 1 over the finite field GF(q), where q is a prime. Let IDj 
denote the identity of the participant pj. The 6 subshares i ,1, . . . ,  si,6 are computed from fi(x) 
as follows: 
si,j =f i ( ID j )  (modq),  j= l , . . . ,6 .  
Obviously, given any two subshares, si,j and si,k, f~(x) can be reconstructed from the Lagrange 
interpolating polynomial as follows [11]: 
(x - IDk) (x - IDj) (mod q). 
fi(x) = si,3 (IDj - IDk) + Si,k (IDk - IDj) 
Thus, the submaster key ki(= fi(O)) can be obtained, but less than two subshares provide no 
information about the submaster key. 
The master key of the SSS(G) is given by K = kl +k2+. . -+k6 (rood q). The shares of 
participants are given by 
81 ---- (--, k2, 83,1,84,1, 85,1, k6), 
82 = (kl, - ,  ks, s4,~, s~,2, s6,2), 
83 = <sl,3, k2, - ,  k4, s5,3, s6,3>, 
S 4 • (81,4, 82,4, k3, --, k5, k6), 
$5 ---- {81,5, S2,5, 83,5, k4, --, k6}, 
S 6 ~- {kl, 82,6, 83,6, k4, k5, -} ,  where ' ' denotes empty  entry. 
If A = {Pl,P2} E F, A can recover the master key K as follows. 
(1) Participant Pl can obtain k2 and k6 because he owns his share S1. 
(2) Participant P2 can obtain kl and k3 because he owns his share $2. 
(3) Participants Pl and P2 can recover k4 from 84,1 of $1 and 84, 2 of S 2. 
(4) Participants pl and P2 can recover k5 from s5,1 of $1 and s5,2 of S~. 
Therefore, participants Pl and P2 can compute K = kl + k2 +. , .  + k6 (rood q). On the other hand, 
if B = {Pl,P3} E A, B cannot recover either kl or k3. Therefore, B can obtain no information 
about the master key K. 
3.  APPL ICAT ION 
Our secret sharing scheme for graph-based access structures can be employed in many appli- 
cations in various areas, such as secure communication etworks, and secure databases. It is 
particularly useful for access control (e.g., reading a file, or sending a message) in an environment 
where the number of participants is large, such as a large secure network. Consider a network 
system with n participants, where an access control policy is enforced by a communication grant- 
ing server (CGS) to restrict the communication between participants. A secure session key will 
not be issued unless the sender requesting the key is allowed to communicate with the receiver. 
The access control matrix employed in conventional access control mechanisms can be used by 
the CGS to achieve the goal [12]. However, the CGS need to store and search the large access 
control matrix of size O(n2). This size of information causes heavy storage and computation 
loads on the CGS when n is large. In the worst case, the storage and computation loads may 
make this design impractical. 
In contrast, the perfect secret sharing scheme for graph-based access structures is more effi- 
cient. We can transform the communication relationships into a graph where a vertex denotes 
a participant and an edge does a legal communication. In the network system, each participant 
holds a secret (which can be regarded as his private secret key). The secret can be transformed 
into the corresponding share in the secret sharing scheme by the communication granting server. 
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Two participants present heir secrets to the CGS when attempting to communicate. If the two 
corresponding shares generated by the two secrets can successfully determine the master key, 
the CGS will return a session key to both participants. This session key will be used as both 
encryption and decryption keys for future communication between these two participants. In the 
scheme, the CGS need not maintain a large access control matrix, but only needs to keep a single 
master key. 
In the following, we state the communication granting protocol for the support of the legal 
communication i detail. It is clear that any access matrix (communication relationships) for 
legal communication can be transformed into a graph where a vertex denotes a participant and 
an edge denotes a legal communication. Let graph G denote the access graph, Si (1 < i < n) 
be the share of the participant p~ in a secret sharing scheme based on the access graph G, and 
K be the master key of the secret sharing scheme. We assume the communication granting server 
has the secret key Kcas .  Each participant pi holds a Ti in secret, where Ti = {Si}KcGs (Si is 
encrypted with CGS's secret key Kccs) .  
Sender Receiver 
Figure 2, Communication granting protocol 
Figure 2 illustrates the communication granting protocol. The following abbreviations are used 
in the protocol. 
s --+ sender 
r --+ receiver 
K~,y -~ session key for x and y 
{M}K~,y  --* message M encrypted with the session key shared by x and y 
The steps of the protocol are listed in the following. 
{s,r,Ti }Kp i,CoS 
STEP 1. Pi ' CGS. 
{s,r,Kpi,pj}KPj,CGS 
STEP 2. CGS ) Pj.  
{s,r,Tj }Kpj ,c~s 
STEP 3. Pj ) CGS. 
Then, CGS checks whether S~ and Sj,  derived from Ti and Tj, respectively, can recover the 
master key K or not. If not, the request for communication is illegal. 
{s,r ,gp i ,Pj }KP i , cos  
STEP 4. CGS ' Pi. 
It is clear that if the request of communication between a pair of participants i illegal, then the 
CGS will not return a session key to the sender. Thus, the communication between the pair of 
participants will not be processed. Note that no subset of participants can recover the master 
key without the help of CGS. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we propose an efficient construction of perfect secret sharing schemes for graph- 
based access structures. The information rate of our scheme is 1/(n - 1). Our scheme does not 
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need to ma inta in  a large access check matr ix ,  and thus  is more  efficient. Our  efficient scheme can 
be appl ied  to access control  in an env i ronment  where  the  number  of par t i c ipants  is large. The  
CGS based on our  scheme does not  need to ma inta in  a large n × n access control  matr ix ,  but  
instead on ly  needs to keep a single master  key. Thus,  the storage and computat ion  loads on the  
CGS are great ly  reduced.  
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